Electoral fraud affects results: Parliamentary Committee -- ‘Managing the roll’ (3)

Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament of Australia, Canberra

2.65 In his submission to the inquiry Mr Jim Lloyd MP pointed out the difficulty he has experienced in verifying the deaths of electors in his electorate as Members of Parliament do not have access to the records of Registrars of Births, Deaths and Marriages. 93
2.66 The Liberal Party expressed its concern with the removal of names of the deceased from the electoral roll and the 'slow rate' at which this occurs.
94 The Liberal Party noted the comments of Mr Lloyd MP with regard to his electorate of Robertson in which Mr Lloyd estimates it takes an average of five months for the name of a deceased elector to be removed from the roll. 95
2.67 The Government response to Recommendation 40 of the committee's 1998 Federal Election Inquiry Report stated that in order to 'facilitate the automated removal of names of deceased electors from the rolls, the Registrars of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in the States/Territories have provided the AEC with electronic information on deaths'.
96 The Fact of Death File, as this information is known, is being evaluated and 'new operation procedures will be implemented as soon as the systems for the electronic matching of death data are brought online'. 97 The Government believes the AEC will be able to match deceased electors across State/Territory boundaries and 'will allow the identification of deceased electors who are enrolled in a different State/Territory from where their death is registered'. 98

Return to sender mail
2.68 One method used by parliamentarians to gauge the accuracy of the electoral roll has been return to sender mail. As part of its submission to the 1996 federal election inquiry, the AEC emphasised how important it was for parliamentarians to use the most up to date version of the roll to minimise inaccuracies. 99
93 Submission p S622 (J.Lloyd).
94 Submissions p S398 (Liberal Party).
95 Submissions p S398 (Liberal Party).
96 Government Response to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Report: The 1998 Federal Election. p 16.
97 Government Response to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Report: The 1998 Federal Election. p 16.
98 Government Response to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Report: The 1998 Federal Election. p 16.
99 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 2000. The 1998 Federal Election: Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and matters related thereto. Canberra, CanPrint, p 18.

Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Canberra
2.69 Submissions to previous committee inquiries, in particular from Members of Parliament, have highlighted concern about high rates of return to sender mail and the accuracy of the roll.100 The Liberal Party drew attention to its submission to the committee's inquiry into the conduct of the 1990 federal election in which it noted that 'parliamentarians report that 5-7% of the people on the roll who are written to, do not reside at their stated address'.101 The Liberal Party pointed out: claims of this type cannot be dismissed as nonsense given the evidence which is provided constantly from large-scale mailing from parliamentarians to their electors.102
2.70 In response the AEC noted the following:
— Not all electors are pleased to receive constituency mail from Members of Parliament and may seek to stop any further communication by RTS mail;
— The rolls are continuously amended and Members of Parliament have used out-of-date versions in addressing their mail in the past;
— The Australian elector population is relatively mobile, resulting in a high level of daily enrolment transactions; and
— Not everyone transfers their enrolments as promptly as they should, so that the rolls will never be 100% accurate at any point in time.103
2.71 Hon Tom Stephens MLC, Leader of the Opposition in the Western Australian Legislative Council, stated that when mail from State and Federal Members of Parliament to electors is returned, they advise the AEC which sends a letter to the elector inquiring as to the person's enrolment status.104 Mr Stephens noted that 'if the AEC mail is returned undelivered, the objection process is expeditiously completed and the voter's name removed from the roll'.105 He was concerned that there is:
an unhealthy preoccupation with expeditiously removing the names of such people from the rolls; and no commensurate concern to inquire where such people could possibly be and how can they be assisted in ensuring their correct enrolment at their correct address and with postal addresses and contact details that
100 Submissions p S498 (AEC). 101 Submissions p S397 (Liberal Party). 102 Submission p S397 (Liberal Party). 103 Submissions p S1164 (AEC). 104 Submissions p S780 (T.Stephens). 105 Submissions p S780 (T.Stephens).
will ensure they can have their lawful electoral enrolments maintained.106
2.72 In addition, according to Mr Stephens, many people in regional areas, because of poor literacy skills, no access to a mail collection service, or a disregard for mail of any sort, do not attend to their mail.107 He suggested that when following up return to sender mail, the AEC should include contacting electors via telephone and checking with local state and federal MPs, local governments, Aboriginal community organisations and local post offices.108
2.73 The committee shares the concerns expressed by Mr Stephens that the AEC does not appear to be pursuing all avenues for contacting electors when following up return to sender mail. Accordingly the committee supports the recommendation of Mr Stephens that the checking of enrolment details triggered by return to sender mail by the AEC should be broadened to include telephone checking and liasing with other local sources such as State and Federal Members of Parliament and local government authorities.
Recommendation 2
2.74 That when following up return to sender mail the Australian Electoral Commission use all practical means in contacting electors to confirm their enrolment details.
Full habitation review
2.75 Prior to 1995, section 92 of the Electoral Act required the AEC to conduct a two yearly habitation review or Electoral Roll Review (ERR) via a national door-knock.109 The AEC stated that the ERR was 'highly resource intensive' and 'because of the high mobility of the Australian population, this periodic snapshot of the roll became rapidly dated, particularly around the time of the close of rolls for an election'.110 In addition, there were tensions between the Joint Roll partners over the timing of ERRs,
106 Submissions p S780 (T.Stephens). 107 Submissions p S780 (T.Stephens). 108 Submissions p S780 (T.Stephens). 109 Submissions p S504 (AEC). 110 Submissions p S504 (AEC).
'with each jurisdiction wanting the ERR as close as possible to their own electoral event'.111
2.76 The committee recommended in its 1992 Report, The conduct of elections: New boundaries for cooperation, and 1993 Federal Election Inquiry Report that Section 92 of the Electoral Act be amended:
... to allow more flexibility in the timing of electoral roll reviews and so as to ensure that roll reviews are conducted between elections on an ongoing basis'.112
2.77 The Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act 1995 amended section 92 of the Electoral Act to allow continuous updating of the roll by the AEC.
2.78 Following a successful trial of continuous roll updating in Queensland in 1996 and 1997, and the negotiation of agreements with Australia Post and other Commonwealth and State/Territory government agencies for access to change of address information, the AEC was able to commence CRU in 1999. In that year the rolls for the Commonwealth, States, Territories and Local Government were updated using CRU activities by both the AEC and its State/Territory counterparts. At the national level this involved:
— Mailing of letters to persons who changed addresses by completing an Australia Post (AP) Change of Address (COA) form and where RMANS did not show an enrolment change had occurred; and
— Vacant Address Mailing (VAM) where letters were mailed to addresses on the RMANS Address Register with no current enrolment with the aim of contacting eligible electors who may live at those addresses.113
At the State and Territory level CRU activities included:
... receiving data from energy authorities, motor registries and mailing to people who have changed their address or became eligible to enrol and incorporating enrolment forms into all government change of address forms.114
111 Submissions p S504 (AEC). 112 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 1994. The 1993 Federal Election: Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of the 1993 Federal Election and matters related thereto. Canberra, AGPS, p 48. 113 Electoral Council of Australia. December 1999. Report of the 1999 Continuous Roll Update Activities to update the electoral roll for the Commonwealth, States, Territories and Local Government. p 5. http://www.eca.gov.au/reports/1999_cru_report.pdf 114 Electoral Council of Australia. December 1999. Report of the 1999 Continuous Roll Update Activities to update the electoral roll for the Commonwealth, States, Territories and Local Government. p 5. http://www.eca.gov.au/reports/1999_cru_report.pdf
2.79 CRU 'is still maturing and full implementation is some 18 months away' 115 , according to the AEC. The AEC noted that midway through the implementation process 'the level of enrolment activity nationally exceeds that generated previously under full ERR door-knocking', and, importantly, electors are 'increasingly being enrolled when they become eligible' as opposed to when they choose to 'initiate contact with the AEC'.116
2.80 The AEC stated that CRU has replaced the ERR.117 The AEC also points out that 'targeted door-knocking is an integral part of the plan for the eventual full implementation of CRU'.118 Fieldwork in the form of door-knocks continues at the divisional level in 'a more cost-efficient targeted form, to confirm address information and enrolment details, particularly in areas of high elector turnover', and where there has been no response to CRU mailout letters.119
2.81 A number of DROs have expressed their discontent with the replacement of periodic national ERRs with CRU.120 In response to an AEC request for comments from DROs on the first AEC submission to the current inquiry, nine DROs, out of the ten DROs who responded, expressed their concerns with CRU and indicted their preference for ERRs.121 Most of these DROs believe ERRs to be more effective than CRU.
2.82 Mr Mark Lamerton, DRO for McPherson, believes that CRU relies too heavily on a continuous mail review at the expense of habitation reviews using door-knocking.122 There is no standardised approach by the nine State and Territory electoral bodies to fieldwork, according to Mr Lamerton.123 Queensland and Western Australia, for example, apply targeted fieldwork only to those addresses that have failed to respond to AEC mailouts, whereas in 2001 NSW is conducting a full door-knock of 8- 10% of each electorate.124 Mr Lamerton recommended that in conjunction with CRU activities, there should be 'a full door-knock review in all urban

115 Submissions p S851 (AEC). 116 Submissions p S851 (AEC). 117 Submissions p S851 (AEC). 118 Submissions p S851 (AEC). 119 Submissions p S505 (AEC). 120 Submissions pp S1109-S1111 (AEC), p S563 (M.Lamerton), p S575 (G.Smith), p S650 (R.Patching) and p S660 (M.Lamerton). 121 Submissions pp S1092-S1107 (AEC). 122 Submissions p S569 (M.Lamerton). 123 Submissions p S569 (M.Lamerton). 124 Submissions p S569 (M.Lamerton).
areas once every election cycle with an emphasis on updating the Address Register'.125
2.83 Mr Graham Smith, DRO for Forde, believes CRU as it currently operates 'does not go far enough'.126 Mr Smith pointed out that CRU 'does not provide total coverage of each Federal Division whereas the "old style" door-knock provide substantially more coverage'.127 Mr Smith recommended that CRU 'be part of an overall strategy which involves a full door-knock of the urban areas of each Federal Division once each election cycle'.128 Mr Smith also recommended this full door-knock should be conducted over a period of 18 months rather than the three month period used in the periodic national door-knock.129
2.84 Mr Robert Patching, DRO for Rankin, recommended 'an immediate in depth habitation review' be undertaken in 2001 to restore public confidence in the integrity of the roll.130 Mr Patching suggested that this habitation review be combined with 'a complete update of the AEC's RMANS Address Register'.131 Mr Patching believes CRU should be replaced by an ongoing door-knock, in which each DRO would conduct a habitation review 'over 10 months of the year using 6 to 8 habitation review officers'.132 He provided a number of reasons to justify his recommendation including:
— Guaranteed employment for a large part of the year will ensure that your 6 to 8 habitation review officers will to a large extent be the same individuals. This will in turn provide the AEC with an additional 6 to 8 vigilant experts who will constantly be in the field;
— The constant presence of electoral officials in the field will generate more voluntary enrolment;
— The RMANS Address Register will be continually updated; and
— The information provided by Australia Post and Centrelink should cease immediately as the quality and authenticity is questionable.133
125 Submissions p S571 (M.Lamerton). 126 Submissions p S590 (G.Smith). 127 Submissions p S591 (G.Smith). 128 Submissions p S590 (G.Smith). 129 Submissions p S591 (G.Smith). 130 Submissions p S657 (R.Patching). 131 Submissions p S657 (R.Patching). 132 Submissions p S658 (R.Patching). 133 Submissions p S658 (R.Patching).
2.85 The AEC noted that many of the DROs who have expressed their dissatisfaction with the replacement of the periodic national ERR by CRU 'may be experiencing problems in adapting to the fundamental changes in approach to roll maintenance that are now expected of them'.134 The AEC also acknowledged that the 'expressed discontent by some DROs' may indicate a failure on the part of the AEC to 'properly inform some Divisional staff about the complexities involved in implementing CRU'.135 The AEC said it is now engaged in activities to improve its consultation with Divisional staff.136 It pointed out that other divisional staff are 'generally supportive of CRU'.137
2.86 Other submissions from Mrs Cherie Reimer, the Liberal Party, the Australian Labor Party (ALP), and Dr Amy McGrath support habitation reviews in the form of door-knocks in conjunction with CRU.138
2.87 The AEC has expressed its confidence in detecting 'any inexplicable surge in enrolments leading to an electoral event'.139 The AEC pointed out that with the implementation of CRU over the past several years the AEC 'should be' able to detect and prevent the type of enrolment fraud associated with internal party plebiscites recently exposed in Queensland.140
2.88 The committee supports the ongoing implementation of CRU by the AEC.

Roll audits of selected Divisions
2.89 A more infrequent method used by the AEC for maintaining the accuracy of the roll, and preventing and detecting fraudulent enrolment are roll audits.141
2.90 According to the AEC, internal audits into the integrity of the rolls at the time of the close of rolls have been conducted previously by the AEC and reported to the committee.142 An example of one such audit was presented

134 Submissions p S852 (AEC). 135 Submissions p S852 (AEC). 136 Submissions p S852 (AEC). 137 Submissions p S852 (AEC). 138 Submissions pp S357 (C.Reimer), p S394 (Liberal Party), p S401 (ALP), p S412 (A.McGrath), and p S613 (A.McGrath). 139 Australian Electoral Commission. Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Inquiry into the 1998 Federal Election and matters related thereto. p S1692. 140 Submissions p S457 (AEC). 141 Submissions p S522 (AEC). 142 Submissions p S522 (AEC).

to the committee following the 1993 federal election, and involved an investigation into return to sender mail in the Division of Gilmore.143
2.91 The Electoral Commissioner indicated at the 3 April 2001 hearing that the AEC is considering similar audits following the next federal election. These audits would check the accuracy of the roll, so would not necessarily be directed at detecting fraud. However, fraud may be detected as part of the process. 144
2.92 The AEC suggested that one mechanism for improving the prevention and detection of fraud might be for the committee to recommend increased funding for the purposes of upgrading the RMANS system to allow an increased frequency of roll audits.145 The estimated cost of such additional funding for roll auditing would be around $25 million per annum.146

Section 85 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918
2.93 Section 85 (1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 provides that 'new rolls for any Subdivision, Division, State or Territory shall be prepared whenever directed by proclamation'. Section 85 (2) provides for the proclamation to 'specify the manner in which the rolls shall be prepared'. Section 85 (2) also states that an enrolled elector shall not be required to complete a further claim for enrolment 'in connection with the preparation of a new Roll'.
2.94 In his submission, the former Australian Electoral Commissioner Professor Colin Hughes recommended the use of section 85 of the Act to undertake a pilot project in a Division such as Herbert in North Queensland to ascertain the impact of the new enrolment procedures.147
2.95 Professor Hughes noted that the Electoral Act makes it 'impossible to conduct a controlled experiment'.148 Professor Hughes 'would like to see more experimentation, which may entail legislative change'.149 The proposed revision of the roll in Herbert in accordance with section 85 of the Act, would enable the AEC to:

143 Submissions pp S1233-S1236 (AEC). 144 Transcript p 559 (AEC). 145 Submissions p S839 (AEC). 146 Submissions p S840 (AEC). 147 Submissions p S387 (C.Hughes). 148 Transcript p 236 (C.Hughes). 149 Transcript p 236 (C.Hughes).

check things on the ground and to try something that is slightly different without having to say 12 million people and 148 electoral districts are having to do this all at once'.150
Revising the roll in Herbert would enable the AEC to uncover any irregularities that have not been picked up through the RMANS and CRU processes.
2.96 De-Anne Kelly MP, Member for Dawson, believed the evidence presented to the Shepherdson Inquiry reveals that the integrity of the electoral roll in Queensland has been compromised.151 Ms Kelly recommended that 'there be an exhaustive cleansing of the electoral roll in Queensland'.152 The cleansing process, according to Ms Kelly, should involve both an AEC mailout to all electors 'requesting an immediate confirmation of their enrolment' at their declared address and subsequent 'Statewide house-to-house visits by AEC staff to confirm those enrolment details'.153 Further to this recommendation, Ms Kelly suggested the committee recommend supplementary funding for the AEC to undertake the revision of the electoral roll in Queensland.
2.97 The AEC pointed out that section 85 of the Act has 'never been tested'.154 Therefore the AEC noted it would be necessary to obtain legal advice on how section 85 of the Act should be interpreted in terms of the type of review that could be undertaken.155 The AEC agreed that a review of the roll for a division such as Herbert may be 'useful activity', but could not be justified in terms of the level of fraudulent enrolment uncovered in recent inquiries.156
2.98 Given the need to resolve the interpretation of section 85, the AEC suggested that rather than creating a new roll the AEC conduct a 'highly resource-intensive door-knock and letter-drop across the whole of the Division, and refresh the roll through the consequent AEC objection action and follow-ups'.157 The advantages to this proposal are that these procedures are already in place, could be 'managed by the AEC with

150 Transcript p 236 (C.Hughes). 151 Submissions p S390 (D.Kelly). 152 Submissions p S390 (D.Kelly). 153 Submissions p S390 (D.Kelly). 154 Transcript p 583 (AEC). 155 Transcript p 584 (AEC). 156 Transcript p 583 (AEC). 157 Submissions pp S1352-S1353 (AEC).
sufficient special funding' which the AEC estimates to be roughly $320,000, and could be conducted within a very short time frame.158
2.99 The committee is of the view that further information is required as to how a review of the roll in accordance with section 85 of the Act in a Division such as Herbert might be undertaken and its cost implications.
Recommendation 3
2.100 That the Australian Electoral Commission investigate and report on the possible conduct in accordance with section 85 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 of a revision of the Electoral Roll of a Division such as the Federal Division of Herbert.
Identity checks at enrolment
2.101 As a result of the recommendations in the committee's 1996 Federal Election Inquiry Report the Government introduced amendments to the enrolment provisions in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 by the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act (No 1) 1999. 159 The Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act (No 1) 1999 was passed by Parliament on 23 September 1999 and assented to on 13 October 1999. The amendments are to section 98 (Addition of names to rolls) of the Act. These new enrolment requirements mean that:
— The identity of a person enrolling for the first time must be verified through forms of proof of identity documentation prescribed by regulation which may include an Australian birth certificate, passport or photographic driver's licence;
— A person claiming to be an Australian citizen because of the grant of Australian citizenship under the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, must have their citizenship verified in the manner prescribed by regulation before they can enrol; and
158 Submissions p S1353 (AEC). 159 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 1997. The 1996 Federal Election: Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of the 1996 Federal Election and matters related thereto. Canberra, AGPS, pp 7-9.
— All enrolments, including transfers of enrolment, must be witnessed by a person who is currently enrolled and in a class of electors prescribed by regulation.
2.102 The detail of the new enrolment procedures is set out in the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Regulations 2000. Regulation 12 provides that the identity of a person applying for enrolment must be verified by providing the AEC with the original of at least one document mentioned in a prescribed list outlined in Schedule 5 of the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Regulations 2000. The identity of a person applying for enrolment may also be verified by providing the AEC with a written statement from one person on a prescribed list of witnesses outlined in Schedule 4 of the Regulations that the witness is satisfied about the identity of the applicant. Regulation 13 enables persons applying for enrolment who are unable to verify their identity in accordance with Regulation 12 to provide a written reference from a prescribed witness to the AEC. Regulation 14 provides that the Australian citizenship of a person applying for enrolment must be verified through several means including the provision of relevant documents such as a certificate of Australian citizenship or current Australian passport.
2.103 On 2 November 2000 the Special Minister of State advised the committee that the draft Regulations have been finalised and released to the State and Territory governments for consultation. The Minister noted that it was hoped that the regulations would be tabled in the Federal Parliament by the end of 2000 and would take effect in 2001. In April 2001 the AEC noted that the States and Territories have not given their full support to the amended regulations and therefore these are still to be promulgated.160
2.104 The provisions contained in the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act (No 1) 1999 face opposition from the States and Territories.161 Queensland, in particular, has indicated it would re-establish a separate State Electoral Roll when the Commonwealth regulations are promulgated.162
2.105 The Premier of South Australia, Hon John Olsen, indicates that South Australia is 'supportive of efforts to reduce electoral fraud, including the 1999 amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act dealing with

160 Transcript p 566 (AEC). 161 Legislative Assembly of Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee. March 2000. Report No. 19: Implications of the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements. Brisbane, LCARC, p 14. 162 Legislative Assembly of Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee. November 2000. Report No. 28: The prevention of electoral fraud: Interim report. Brisbane, LCARC, pp 12-13.
verification of identity and citizenship'.163 However, Mr Olsen asks the committee to consider 'the impact of any proposal for legislative reform on the joint roll arrangement'.164
2.106 In evidence the AEC pointed out that it has not received any indication that 'States such as Queensland have in any way resiled from their original reluctance to pass complementary legislation' necessary for the implementation of the amended Commonwealth regulations within the joint roll framework.165
2.107 The AEC noted that should the amended regulations come into force this may result in the States and Territories deciding to opt out of the Joint Roll arrangements and establish their own separate State/Territory rolls.166 The eventual outcome, according to the AEC, could be 'nine separate rolls to cover the nine separate electoral jurisdictions'.167 Such an outcome would, according to the AEC, adversely affect the accuracy and integrity of the roll.168 The inconvenience of dual compliance for electors would affect the accuracy of the rolls and lead to disputes over the issues of accuracy and 'which elections best reflect the will of the electorate'.169
2.108 In addition to the potential impact on the joint roll arrangements of the implementation of the provisions of the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act (No 1) 1999, the AEC noted the similar concerns raised by the former Australian Electoral Commissioner, Professor Colin Hughes 170 , Counsel Assisting the Shepherdson Inquiry, Mr Russell Hanson QC 171 , and the Legislative Assembly of Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee (LCARC) in its report into the implications of the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements, published in March 2000. 172
2.109 In its report the LCARC pointed out that the inconvenience and potential cost to them of requiring applicants for enrolment to produce an original form of identification and have their enrolment form witnessed by someone on a list of prescribed persons could deter eligible voters from

163 Submissions p S1144 (J.Olsen). 164 Submissions p S1144 (J.Olsen). 165 Submissions p S824 (AEC). 166 Submissions p S824 (AEC). 167 Submissions p S824 (AEC). 168 Submissions p S824 (AEC). 169 Submissions p S824 (AEC). 170 Submissions pp S821-S822 (AEC). 171 Submissions pp S822-S823 (AEC). 172 Submissions p S483 (AEC).
enrolling. The LCARC believed that the new electoral requirements present a significant obstacle to enrolment. The LCARC cited one example of the effect of making enrolment requirements more stringent. 173 Between 1979 and 1983 enrolment applications in Western Australia were required to be witnessed by a restricted group of people. During this period the number of people on the State roll dropped significantly.
2.110 The Australian Electoral Commissioner, Mr Andy Becker, stated that the AEC's position on the enrolment provisions of the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act (No 1) 1999 is as follows:
The AEC has no objection to such a reform of the enrolment system, provided it imposes no cost or inconvenience on electors and provided that there is a sufficiently broad class of enrolment witnesses. 174
2.111 The Attorney-General's Department stated that a potential problem with requiring proof-of-identity documentation for enrolment is that 'the reliability of documents that people produce is increasingly under threat'.175 The ability to forge, create or modify documents is increasing with rapid technological developments, and 'there are some signs of greater retailing of false identities'. 176 The AEC noted the Attorney-General's Department's:
... preference for strengthening personal identity verification through improvements in computer systems and electronic technology, rather than through reliance on personal identity documentation that is increasingly vulnerable to forgery. 177
2.112 The ALP indicated its continued opposition to the amended enrolment provisions, believing the amended provisions will 'discourage and frustrate the genuine enrolment of many voters'. 178
173 Legislative Assembly of Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee. March 2000. Report No. 19: Implications of the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements. Brisbane, LCARC, p 13.
174 Transcript p 6 (AEC).
175 Transcript p 472 (Attorney-General's Department).
176 Transcript p 472 (Attorney-General's Department).
177 Submissions p S838 (AEC).
178 Submissions p S402 (ALP).

Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Canberra


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